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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLADYS F. LUNDBERG, \Vidow 
and RICHARD F. LUNDBERG, 
J ER 0 L D NEAL LUNDBERG, 
PA ULEEN LUNDBERG and DA-
VID WiLSON LUNDBERG, minor 
dependent children of LEO LATHl::"J;l 
LUNDBERG, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs, Case No. 
vs. 11663 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, CREAM O'\VEBER/FED-
ERATED DAIRY FARMS, INC., 
and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMP ANY, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a claim against the defendant Cream O'-
\Veber Dairy/Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., and its in-
surer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, under the 
1 
Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Utat II, 
for payment of death benefits to the appellants as a re-
sult of the death of Leo L. Lundberg. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
A was held before Robert J. Shaughnes-
sy, Hearing Examiner for the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, after which an Order was entered denying the 
claim of the applicants on the ground that the deceased 
Leo L. Lundberg "was not at the time in the course o!, 
nor did the accident arise out of his employment." Ap-
pellants filed a Motion for Review which was granted. 
Subsequent to said review, the Examiner entered Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
'that Leo L. Lundberg at the time of his death was not 
in the course of his employment nor did his death arise 
out of his employment inasmuch as his vehicle was not 
required .(company cars being available), and did not 
serve a substantial function in the company's business. 
Appellants thereafter filed a Motion for Review by the 
entire Commission, which Motion was denied, and the 
present appeal was initiated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellants seek to have the Court hold as a matter 
of law that the deceased Leo L. Lundberg was at the 
time of his death, acting within the scope and the course 
of his employment and/or that his death arose out of 
2 
his employment, and order the Industrial Commission 
to enter appropriate Orders entitling the appellants to 
death benefits provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are essentially uncontroverted. The de-
ceased Leo L. Lundberg was killed August 31, 1965 in 
a car-train collision at Second 'iV est and 3900 South 
' Salt Lake City, Utah, at approximately 7 :30 o'clock 
a.m.; at his death, he was the husband of the appellant 
Gladys F. Lundberg, and the father of four minor chil-
dren, Richard F. Lundberg, age 17; Jerold Neal Lund-
berg, age 14; Pauleen Lundberg, age 11; and David 
Wilson Lundberg, age 5 (R-73). The deceased was em-
ployed as a wholesale sales manager for Cream O'W eber 
Dairy and had been employed with the dairy for ap-
proximately thirty years in various positions. As whole-
sale sales manager, he was paid $1,000.00 per month and 
had general responsibilities for the wholesale sales op-
eration (R-111). His duties were many: Supervising 
the wholesale deliverymen and their supervisors, calling 
on the restaurants, cafes, stores, and other outlets pro-
moting new sales and protecting existing sales by assist-
ing in promotions, pricing and spacing, and by socially 
entertaining the owners and executives of his customers 
(R-34, 78, 111, 124). 
In addition to his regular duties, he would often 
receive phone calls from customers at night and on 
weekends and it would be his responsibility to satisfy 
3 
the particular problem as soon as practical (R-119, 121), 
He also delivered dairy products in his car to customers 
on occasion, such as holidays and weekends when the 
regular deliverymen were not available (R-81). 
To facilitate the successful execution of these 
duties, the company provided to the deceased a mem-
bership to Willow Creek Country Club and the Towne 
House Club, paying his monthly dues and paying that 
portion of the expenses incurred as a result of business 
entertainment (R-166, 152). The purpose of these clubs 1 
was to entertain customers and were used during busi-
ness hours, at night, and on weekends, whenever social-
izing the customer could be accomplished. The extent of 
his socializing on company business is shown by the ex-
pense vouchers attached to the record, which average 
out at about $85.00 every two weeks. 
The deceased was also an active participant in the 
Grocers' Association where he acted as Golf Tourna-
ment Chairman (R-22) and frequently played golf 
with his customers at Willow Creek Country Club. 
Having been blessed with a magnetic personality and ' 
gregarious nature, he was particular adept at cultivat- 1 
ing the friendships and favor of his customers (R-184). 
He was so effective in his job that one customer re-
f erred to him as "Mr. Cottonwood Dairy" (R-132). 
Essential to his duties was the use of an automobile, 
inasmuch as approximately 50'1° of his work was away 
from the company offices ( R-47, 162) and often in· 
volved transporting to grand openings and other pro· 
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motion events, dairy employees, dairy products, pro-
motion supplies and equipment, and transporting cus-
tomers for business and social purposes ( R-77) . On oc-
casions he would be transporting large items such as 
posters and other paraphernalia us.ed in the promotions 
and grand openings (R-105). The company required 
him to use an automobile in his duties, either his own or 
' one of the company automobiles (R-155, 187). It mat-
tered not to the company what car was used, in fact the 
1 
('Ompany never requested him to use the company ve-
, hicles ( R-164), but merely advised him that they were 
available for his use. The company had a panel truck 
and two Volkswagens stationed at the plant for use by 
the deceased and other supervisory employees during 
business hours (R-156); however, these automobiles 
were unavailable on weekends or after hours, and inas-
much as they were subject to use by other supervisory 
employees (R-187), it may be inferred that on occasions 
they may not be available to deceased. 
The deceased rarely used the company vehicles ( R-
28), pref erring to use his own nine-passenger station-
1 wagon, it being more spacious and apparently, in his 
opinion, better suited for his duties ( R-183). The com-
pany policy regarding the employees' use of their own 
, vehicles was set up to comply with the auditing require-
ments of the Internal Revenue Service ( R-164), and 
thus eight cents per mile was paid for mileage incurred 
during business hours (R-47), but excluded mileage 
from home to the off ice or the first stop, and from the 
last stop or the office to home at night, and also excluded 
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mileage incurred after hours for business entertainment 
and other business purposes ( R-148) . The companv 
provided an expense account to the deceased which 
or)\ed entertainment expenses incurred at any time, 
night or day (R-152, 153). Thus, the mileage policy was 
more restrictive than the expense account in order to 
comply with the Internal Revenue Service ( R-148, 
164). 
The deceased owned two vehicles, however, he kept 
his stationwagon available for company business at night 
and on weekends (R-79). He rarely let his family use 
it, explaining to them that he might need it for a cus-
tomer ( R-79) . 
On the day of his death, he had previously sched-
uled an 8 o'clock a.m., breakfast appointment with a 
customer (R-137); however, a meeting with his whole-
sale routemen concerning wages and route changes re-
quired him to reschedule the breakfast appointment for 
10 o'clock a.m., that same day. The meeting with the 
routemen was to be at 8 o'clock a.m., at the company 
office at 2500 South Second West. He left his house 
earlier than usual that morning and was on a route not 
usually taken by him to the office (R-101). He normal-
ly would take a route along State Street to 2735 South 
and then turn west to the dairy (R-101). On the day of 
his death, he was driving his stationwagon and proceed-
ing north on Second West and while crossing the rail-





THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT DE-
CEASED'S DEATH DID NOT ARISE OUT 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT OR WITHIN THE 
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
The sole issue herein is whether or not the death of 
Leo L. Lundberg occurred in the course of, or arising 
from, his employment, which issue this Court has held 
to be a question of law and the conclusion of which, by 
the Industrial Commission, is not binding on this Court. 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Industrial 
Conirnission, 100 Utah 8, no P.2d 334, (1941). This 
Court is well acquainted with the "Going and Coming 
Doctrine" which is an accepted doctrine excluding 
Workmen's Compensation Coverage to an employee 
traveling to and from his home to his place of employ-
ment. This doctrine, however, has been circumscribed 
with several exceptions, See Vitagraph, Inc., v. Indus-
trial Commission of Utah, 96 U 190, 85 P.2d 601 
(1931). This Court in two recent cases considered and 
rejected application of the "Going and Coming Doc-
trine" and instead applied the so-called "Instrumental-
ity and Substantial Service" exception. In Bailey v. 
Utah State Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 208, 
398 P.2d 545 ( 1965), the deceased was the owner of a 
service station, but under Utah Law was treated as an 
employee of the business. He was killed while driving 
7 
his stationwagon to the business from his home. lu <li;-
cussing the role of the stationwagou, the Court said: 
"It is undisputed that the stationwagon in-
volved was used by the deceased in his busiuess 
and somewhat necessary thereto. He used it fo;. 
emergency calls at all hours, carried in it some 
necessary tools and implements to service or re-
pair customer's automobiles and permitted cus-
tomers to use it while their car was being serv-
iced at his station .... " (Supra, page 546). 
The Court concluded after discussing the case of Davis 
v. Bjorenson, 293 N.W. 829, Iowa (1940), that the sta-
tionwagon was an instrumentality of the business an<l 
that it was an element of the deceased's duties to takf' 
the vehicle to the station in the morning for its use in 
the business, and in so providing the vehicle, he was per-
forming a substantial .service required by the business. 
Likewise, in the Davis case, an employee of the 
service station, as part of his duties, provided his vehicle 
for outside service calls and other work, and in addition, 
was required to use the vehicle for emergency calls after 
hours. He was injured while driving the vehicle to the 
station one morning. The award to applicant was af· 
firmed. 
This Court in discussing Davis, deemed as the im· 
portant elements: The instrumentality of the car in the 
business at all hours of the day and night, that it was the 
employee's duty to have a vehicle in the execution of his 
duties, and in so providing his vehicle, he was perform-
8 
ing a substantial service required by his employer. Using 
similar elements and reasoning, this Court concluded 
that Bailey was acting in the course of his employment, 
and the denial of an award by the Industrial Commis-
sion was reversed. 
Subsequent to the Bailey case, this court decided 
the case of G. B. Moser v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, et al., 21 U.2d 51, 440 P.2d 51 ( 1968), wherein 
the claimant was injured while trying to start a truck-
tractor which was a leased vehicle under the control of 
his employer. Employee was a truck driver and worked 
when a trip was available. He was allowed to drive the 
truck-tractor to his home and back. The Court, in con-
cluding that the injuries sustained were in the course of 
his employment, again applied the Bailey test; i.e., was 
the vehicle committed to use as an instrumentality with-
in the employer's business and did it serve a substantial 
fuction in that business. If so, efforts to make it avail-
able to the employer were within the scope of the em-
ployment. The Court specifically noted the fact that the 
employee derived benefit for himself; i.e., transporta-
tion to his employment, however, such dual purpose did 
not negate application of the exception. 
The appellant submits that the Bailey and Moser 
cases properly confine their inquiry to whether the 
duties of the employee required the use of an automobile 
as an instrumentality to perform a substantial function 
in the business. There is no dispute that such is true in 
the present case. The problem arises from the Commis-
9 
sion's misconstruction of Bailey and JJ-loser and the '·Iu-
strumentality and Substantial Service Exception." 
A cursory examination of the Findings of Fact 
show that the Commission erred in its final formulation 
of the test. On the second page of the .Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (R-232), the Commission eou-
cludes from the Bailey case a necessity that the employer 
require the employee to bring his vehicle for use during 
business hours; and in regards to ]}f oser, the Commis-
sion properly restated the requirement therein, that the 
vehicle be a tool or instrumentality in the employers 
business, which in order to continue its function must 
have been driven to the employer's terminal. However, 
the Commi.ssion then summarily concludes such is not 
the case here. On the third page of the Findings of Fad 
and Conclusions of Law (R-233), the Commission for-
mulates the exception requirement as being "the burde11 
is on the employee to establish the requirement of the 
car being on the job to be used during working hours." 
From these inconsistent bases, the Commission conclud-
ed that the "Going and Coming Doctrine" applied. 
Appellant submits that the Industrial Commission 
has completely misconstrued and misapplied the Bai/elf 
and ]}f oser cases. The essential points in both cases are 
present in this case: The vehicle was committed to use 
as an instrument in carrying out the deceased's required 
du by deceased' s permissible election as to which ve· 
hicle he used; that the use of said vehicle was clearly a 
substantial function of employer's business; and that 
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Lundberg's driving said vehicle from home to work, ad-
mitledly a <lual purpose, arose out of his employment, 
ur was in the course of said employment. To apply the 
rationale of the Industrial Commission would lead to a 
logical absurdity; that is, where an employee is required 
lo use a vehicle in executing his duties, however, because 
he is a trusted and valuable employee it is left to his dis-
l'rdion and judgment as to what vehicle he uses, and 
there being no requirement as to any specific vehicle 
Gtiug used, he would not be within his employment in 
dridng it from home to work. Thus, under the Com-
mission's rationale, even had Lundberg been driviug a 
t:om1,a11y vehicle from his home to his office the morning 
ht was killed, he would not have been within his em-
ployment, because that vehicle was not specifically re-
11uired. 
Surely, Lundberg is not to be treated differently 
from Mcser and Bailey merely because his employer, 
as an expression of confidence gave him discretion as to 
11 hat vehicle he used in his required duties. It is clear 
from the facts that Lundberg made an election as to 
ll'hich vehicle he felt was best suited for the carrying out 
of hi:: numerous duties and had, in fact, committed his 
, rehicle as an instrumentality performing a substantial 
function in his employer's business. 
Cases from other jurisdictions clearly sustain the 
position above elucidated. A case directly in point is that 
of Ki11.<J v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 315 
P.2d H8, Ore., ( 1957). There, the deceased employee, 
11 
King, was employed in the construction of a floating log 
boom, on a large body of water. His employer, who had 
no contractual obligation to provide transportation to 
the place of employment, had, nevertheless, made avail-
able a company-owned boat for use of the employees in 
transporting themselves to the place of employment and 
then for use in their duties of constructing the log boom. 
On the day that King was killed, he had elected to take 
his own boat, which he had done on other occasions, and 
to use the same in performing his duties on the boom 
construction site. His employer did not pay him for ex-
penses incurred in driving his boat to the place of em-
ployment. The lower court affirmed the State Industrial 
Accident Commission's denial of compensation to King's 
widow, holding that the accident did not arise out of, or 
in the course, of his employment. The appellate court 
reversed that conclusion and held, as a matter of law, 
that under the facts, King was acting within the course 
of his employment. In doing so, the Court relied upon 
the following elements: 
I. A boat was essential to King's duties at the con· 
struction site. 
2. That King had used his own boat on the day of 1 
the accident because he felt it was better suited for the 
job to be done that day. 
3. That the boat served a dual purpose, that is, in 
providing transportation of King to the work site, and 
as an instrumentality in the performance of his duties 
thereat. 
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The Court then made a scholarly study of cases 
a1Hl other works relating to exception to the "Going 
anJ Coming Doctrine" and concluded: 
. "\Ve conclude that the act of King in bring-
mg the boat across the bay served the interests of 
the employers and was of direct benefit to them . 
. . . " (Supra, page 155). 
The Court treated the boat as a vehicle and as an essen-
tiai tool or instrument of King's employment, and the 
fact that the employer had a boat available was of J?.O 
consequence. In fact, it appears there, as in the present 
case, that the employee, in using his own vehicle, was 
emcising discretion permitted by the employer to make 
possible completion of his duties in a more satisfactory 
and efficient manner. 
The Oregon Court also referred to the Davis v. 
Hjorenson case, and as in the Bailey case, directed its 
attention to the fact that the vehicle constituted an in-
, strumentality performing a substantial service for the 
I
I employer. The Oregon Court also discussed a Texas 
C"ase directly in point: Jones v. Texas Indemnity In-
surance Company, Tex. Civ. App., 223 S.W.2d 286 
11961) .Here, the employee was a serviceman for ahouse-
1 hold equipment company. His duties required the use of 
1
1,111 automobile during business hours and also for emer-
gency calls after hours. He was paid five cents per mile 
\ for mileage incurred on the company business. The em-
\ ployee was injured driving from his home to the store 
one morning. The Court held that the use of the auto-
13 
mobile served a substantial function in his employer's 
business, and thus his transferring the automobile to the 
place of business was an activity within the course of 
his employment. 
Other cases to this same effect are: Smith v. Work-
men's Compensation Appea/,s Board, 447 P.2d 365, 73 
Cal. Rpt. 253 ( 1968) . There, the deceased was a social 
worker killed driving his vehicle to work one morning, 
The application for death benefits was denied. The 
Court reversed that denial. The Court first discussed 
the "Going and Coming Rule" and the various excep-
tions to it; however, it limited its holding to the single 
exception of an employee bringing his car to his place of 
employment where the vehicle's function is required in , 
the employee's employment. The county had cars avail-
able for the use of the social workers, however, the de-
ceased had never availed himself of their use, although 
he had discretion in that regard. The California Court 
then discussed the prior California case, Postal Tele-
phone Cable Company v. Industrial Accident Commli-
sion, 37 P.2d 441, I Cal. 2d 730 {1934), wherein the 
Court had given wide rein to the "Going and Coming 
Rule." The Court concluded that the necessity of the 
"Going and Coming Rule" had changed with modern 
times. The Court made the following statement in re-
jecting Postal Telegraph: 
"Postal Telegraph must be overruled 
it does not recognize an important limitatwn 
upon the going and coming rule. That limitation 
arises from the principle that an employee is per-
14 
l 
forming service growing out of and incidental to 
his employment when he engages in conduct rea-
sonably directed toward the fulfillment of his 
employer's requirements, performed for the bene-
fit and advantage of the employer. Suspension 
of the employment relation and consequent non-
coverage of the employee is incompatible with 
performance of service required by the employer. 
Hence, the employer's requirement that the 
worker furnish a vehicle of transportation on the 
job curtails the application of the going and 
coming rule." (Supra, page 368-369). 
The Court then went on to explain that the requirement 
for an automobile did not have to be express or even im-
plied in the employment contract, but was required in 
this context if an automobile was required in the per-
formance of the employee's duties, and thus driving a 
rehicle to work to perform those duties was inferred. 
The California Court also directed itself to the old 
Utah cases of Denver-Rio Grande Western Railway 
Company v. Industrial Commission, 72 Utah 199, 269 
P 512 ( 1928), and Fidelity and Casualty Company v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 79 U 189, 8 P.2d 617 
(1932), which cases had been previously cited in the 
Postal Telegraph case. The Court distinguished the 
Denver case on its facts, and in regard to Fidelity Casu-
alty noted that it had been rejected and overturned by 
this Court's Bailey decision. 
The Court then concludes : 
"We conclude that the decisional basis of 
Postal Telegraph has been eroded, that the case 
15 
.. not represent the trend of authority, and 
that it must be overruled. Surely, in this day ·of 
a highly motorized society, we cannot case the 
going and coming rule as a protective cloak over 
the shoulders of the employer, who, for his own 
advantage, demands that the employee furnish 
the car on the job. Smith's obligation reached out 
beyond the employer's premises, in driving his 
car to and from there, he did no more than fu]. 
fill the conditions and requirements of his em-
ployment." (Supra, page 373). 
"Since Postal Telegraph, however, the trend ' 
has been decidedly in favor of recovery, and Pro· 
fessor Larson regards this treatment as the better 
rule. 1 The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 
Section 17 50 .... " (Supra, page 372). 
The Court also noted that since Postal Telegraph, 
ten cases have arisen in other jurisdictions wherein in· 
juries or death were incurred while driving a vehicle re· 
quired in the employee's duties, to or from work. Seven 
of ten jurisdictions allowed recovery under the 
Workmen's Compensation Laws: State Department o/ 
Highways v. John, 422 P.2d 855, Alaska, (1967); 
Bailey v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 16 U.2d 
208, 298 P.2d 545 (1965) Willis v. Cloud, 151 S.2d 369 
(La.App.); Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Kiel, 
167 N.E.2d 604, Ind.; King v. State Industrial Acci· 
dent Commission, 315 P.2d 148, Ore.; Borak v. H. E. 
Westerman Lumber Company, 58 N.W.2d 567, Minn.; 
Davis v. Bjorenson, 293 N.W. 829, Iowa (1940). 
Borak v. H. E. Westerman Lumber Company, 
supra, is another case directly in point with the present 
16 
appeal. There Barak was a manager of a lumber yar<l. 
1t was his duty to supervise the men at the yard and on 
rarious jobs outside the yard, and in addition, made 
small deliveries of merchandise and other errands for 
his employer. The use of an automobile was expected in 
connection with his duties as manager and he was paid 
seven cents per mile while using his automobile on com-
pany business, except when driving to and from work. 
It was also established in that case that Barak used his 
car in performing these duties except on occasion when 
he would use a company car or truck. The Court con-
cluded that Borak's car was "customarily used" in the 
business, which finding the Court held was determina-
ti1e. The facts there showed that Barak had customarily 
taken his car to work for the use in his duties as man-
ager. That on the morning of his death, in attempting 
to start the car in his garage, he was asphyxiated. The. 
employer attempted to distinguish this case from a prior 
rase in Minnesota where the car was being prepared for 
an immediate outside errand. The Court said in re-
sponse: 
" ... However, that difference in itself is not 
sufficient to warrant denying compensation where 
there is a reasonable inference that decedent was 
trying to start his car in order to take it to his 
place of business to be ready for use, if necessary. 
Neither can compensation be denied under the 
facts and circumstances here because on the par-
ticular dav of decendent's death, his work prob-
ably would have been confined to work in the 
office on invoices, etc. Inasmuch as it had been 
his custom for years to have the car at the lumber 
17 
yard for company use when required." (Supra 
page 571). ' ! 
Although there are numerous other cases, included 
in which are some Utah cases, which talk generally on 
the of vehicles, it appears that the Bailey and Moser 
cases represent the present position of the Utah Law in 
regards to the facts of this case. A careful reading of the 
Bailey and Moser cases, and comparable cases in other 
jurisdictions, clearly shows that the Industrial Comrnis· 
sion erred in failing to conclude that Lundberg's death 
arose out his employment or occurred within the course 
of his employment, for it is without serious dispute that 
his car was essential to the performance of his numerous 
duties as wholesale sales manager; that although a com-
pany vehicle may have been available on given days, he 
obviously concluded that his was more available and 
better suited to performing his duties, which election 
was permitted by his employer; and that by driving his 
vehicle to work the day he was killed, he was carrying 
out a substantial function of his employment, and was 
of direct benefit to his employer. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission, in denying appellants claim, acted 
arbitrarily and contrary to law. To find under the pres· , 
ent facts, as the Commis!'lion did, that the deceased' s re· 
hicle was not an instrumentality in, and necessary to the 
company's business, is clearly unsupportable in fact or 
18 
Jaw. Equally unsupportable in law is the Commission's 
demand that the vehicle in which Lundberg was killed 
be the required vehicle. Deceased's duties required an 
automobile. Clearly, he elected to use his own vehicle in 
order to maximize his efficiency and ability in his many-
faceted duties. To now penalize his dependents for serv-
ing his employer so well is contrary to the law and the 
spirit of Utah \Vorkmen's Compensation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Delbert M. Draper, Jr. 
W. Brent Wilcox 
DRAPER, SANDACK & 
SAPERSTEIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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